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This paper investigates the likelihood of factor-price equalization under the sim-
ple assumptions of Heckscher-Ohlin Theory. Factor-price equalization is also
directly related to whether countries specialize or not in the global market.
A full-equilibrium in the world requires not only the equilibrium in the pro-
duction side of the economy, but also the suppy-demand equality in the world.
However, once we obtain an equilibrium in the production side of the economy,
it is always possible to de￿ne demand in a way to get supply-demand equality
at any production side equilibrium amounts. Therefore, it is not possible to talk
about factor-price equalization without specifying demand in the economy.
Using L-P diagrams, the paper demonstrates how both factor-price equalization
and non-equalization cases are possible when we look at only the production side
of the economy. It is also demonstrated that the equilibrium possibilities will be
much larger for factor-price equalization case if the number of commodities is
more than the number of factors of production. However, the larger possibilities
do not refer to di⁄erent real equilibria, but only to indeterminacy in production.
When demand is introduced in the economy and supply-demand equality con-
straints are respected, we see that factor-prices might or might not be equalized
depending on factor endowments, production functions and demand. The paper
demonstrates this by introducing a model with 2 countries, 2 factors of produc-
tion, 3 goods and CES utility function. Finally, using comparative statistics
on this simple model, the conditions under which the likelihood of factor-price
equalization increases are determined.
11 Introduction
In 1933, Bertil Ohlin published the book which was explaining one of the most
discussed theories of all economic research history. Even if Ohlin wrote the book
alone, Heckscher, who had earlier worked on the problem and who supervised
Ohlin in his doctoral thesis, was also credited as a co-developer of the model.
Later in 1977, Bertil Ohlin won Nobel Prize for his "path breaking contribution
to the theory of international trade and international capital movements"1. The
interest on his theory was at its peak during the 50s, 60s, and 70s. Over the
following decades, this interest calmed down, as academicians like Brander,
Dixit, Grosman, Helpman, and Krugman published a vast array of interesting
models that focus on economies of scale and strategic interactions.
In order to understand the signi￿cance of Heckscher-Ohlin Theory (H-O The-
ory), it will be useful to look at the Ricardian model of comparative advantage,
which was a widely referred model among trade theorists before the introduc-
tion of H-O model to the international trade literature. According to Ricardo￿ s
model, trade was motivated by di⁄erent technologies, and therefore di⁄erent
labor productivities between the countries. The model was an essential contri-
bution to trade theory for two reasons: First, it showed that trade can create
wealth so that it can bene￿t both countries involved in it. Second, it estimated
the direction of trade of a good: from the country that has comparative advan-
tage to the one that has comparative disadvantage2.
Even if the argument for technological di⁄erences between the countries is ac-
ceptable, the necessity of such di⁄erences to create mutual bene￿ts to the coun-
tries involved in trade was undermining the usefulness of trade. Under such a
theory, there will not be any use of trade whenever the technological di⁄erences
between the countries are eliminated. All countries behave then as if they are
autarkies.
In H-O model, there is no need for technological di⁄erences for trade to be
mutually bene￿cial. The model is based on identical production technologies
throughout the world. The model introduces capital as an additional factor of
production along with labor3, and it implies that trade can create wealth even if
all the countries share the same production technologies whenever the countries
di⁄er from each other in terms of their factor endowments.
1http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1977/index.html
2Comparative advantage theory explains why trade will be bene￿cial for both countries
involved in it even though one of them can produce every kind of item more e¢ ciently than
the other. It states that for trade to be mutully bene￿cial, what actually matters is the ratio
between how easily the two countries can produce di⁄erent kinds of goods.
3We can also have more than two factors of production in H-O model. However, the model
was initially de￿ned with two factors of production, namely labor and capital. It has been
mostly used in this format afterwards.
2Even though Heckscher and Ohlin introduced the idea of factor endowment dif-
ferences as the foundation of international trade, Ohlin￿ s book was mostly ver-
bose rather than mathematical. Moreover, there were a lot of possible extensions
that might be considered using the framework of H-O Theory. As economists
analyzed the model further, they come up with strong, and sometimes debat-
able propositions. Rybcznski4, Stolper-Samuelson5, and Factor-Price Equaliza-
tion6 theorems were developed using the framework provided by H-O Theory.
Especially, the Factor-Price Equalization Theorem was discussed considerably
thereafter.
The original H-O model was a 2-2-27 model. In this model, given the prices of
commodities, the production amount of each good in each country is uniquely
determined. Given that the demand functions in the two countries are the
same, this also determines who exports what to the neighboring country. So, a
new mechanism of comparative advantage was introduced into the international
trade literature which was based on the factor intensity ratios of the countries.
Later, academicians looked at 2-3-2 case. J.E. Meade (1950) seems to be the
￿rst who recognized the indeterminacy in production8 in 2-3-2 case. Samuelson
(1953) explained the reason for the indeterminacy geometrically by pointing out
that there will be ￿ at planes and straight lines on the convex locus, and there-
fore there will not be a unique tangency when the international trading ratio is
exactly equal to one of these ratios. W. P. Travis (1964) showed the indetermi-
nacy diagrammatically and algebraically. Later, Melvin (1968) examined some
of the well-known trade propositions under the 2-3-2 case, and he developed a
methodology of using Edgeworth Box to depict the case when there are 3 goods.
One other point discussed previously was about how many goods a country will
be producing in General Equilibrium (GE). Land (1959) argued that when there
4The Rybczynski theorem basically tells that when the endowment of a factor is increased
there will be a relative increase in the production of the good using this factor more intensely.
As a result, there will be a corresponding decline in that good￿ s relative price.
5Stolper-Samuelson theorem tells that ￿ under some economic assumptions (constant
returns, perfect competition) ￿ an increase in the relative price of a good results in an
increase in the price of the factor which is used more intensively in the production of that
good, and a fall in the price of the factor that is used less intensely in the production of that
good.
6Factor-price-equalization theorem tells that the prices of identical factors of production
will be equal as a result of the competition.
72-2-2 case refers to the situation when there are 2 factors of production, 2 goods and 2
countries. Note that for analogous statements, the ￿rst index refers to the number of factors,
the second index refers to the number of goods and the third index refers to the number of
countries.
8I want to clarify what I mean by indeterminacy in production in order to avoid confusion.
Given the prices of goods, we talk about indeterminacy in production when the aggregate
quantity produced in the world is determinate but the quantites produced in each country
are indeterminate at equilibrium. The equilibrium factor-prices are the same for all these
equilibria. Since the only thing that is di⁄erent is the quantity bundles produced in each
contry, I consider all these equilibria as the same real equilibrium.
3are more goods than the factor endowments, under free trade, the number of
goods produced in each country will not be more than the number of factors.
However, there is an inherent con￿ ict of this argument. What if the number of
goods is more than that of the multiplication of the factors of production and
the number of countries in the world? If Land￿ s argument is right, there will
not be any positive production for some goods. Assuming that there will be
strictly positive demand for any good whatever its price is, we cannot talk of
equilibrium if Land is right.
Land is right in proposing that for a random price system given exogenously to
the economy, the countries will choose to produce as many goods as the number
of factors. This point was also mentioned by Samuelson and Vanek and Bertrand
(1971). However, in a GE situation, prices are not random. They are determined
endogenously in the economy. Prices adjust in a way to make ￿rms in a country
indi⁄erent between producing some of them. This permits the number of goods
produced in positive quantity to be more than the number of factors in GE.
However, it leads to above-mentioned indeterminacy in production case.
All of the papers that I mentioned above worked on factor-price equalization
cases. Also, they worked only on the production side of the economy. Melvin
stresses this point and he reminds that the demand conditions are equally im-
portant as supply conditions in determining what the ￿nal equilibrium will be.
He rightly says that it is not possible to conclude that factor-prices are equalized
without taking into account the factors on the demand side.
Factor-price equalization is probably the most intensely discussed topic of the H-
O Theorem. It is completely interrelated with whether the countries specialize9
in production or not and whether the aggregate production bundles in countries
are indeterminate or not. Whenever we consider only the production part of the
economy, it is possible to create equilibrium for both factor-price equalization
and non-equalization cases. For both cases, given the aggregate production
bundle in the world, it is possible to de￿ne the demand side of the economy
in such a way so that the consumers demand exactly this aggregate production
bundle10. This means that it is possible to have a full GE for both factor-price
equalization and non-equalization cases. So, a crucial question of academic
research arises. When do factor-prices equalize?
9Berofe moving forward, I want to clarify what I mean by specialziation. If there are N
goods in the world, and if a country produces positive units of only N0 goods, where N0 < N,
the country is said to be specialized in the production of these N0 goods. That is, I talk about
specialization in a country whenever that country is not involved in the production of one or
more goods. I call a GE a case of specialization if there is at least one country who specializes
in production.
10If we assume that all consumer in the world share the same CES utility function, the only
thing we need to do to ensure supply-demand equality is to arrange the parameters of the
utility function in a way so that the relative demand of goods at the equilibrium prices will
be the same as the relative equilibrium production amounts.
4Determining whether factor-prices equalize or not, or equivalently whether coun-
tries specialize in production of a subset of goods or not, has signi￿cance beyond
the mechanical test of the H-O trade model. The question is even more impor-
tant today. As the world gets closer and markets are more globalized, people
wonder how the wages in the industrialized western countries will be in￿ uenced
from the growing competition coming from the workers in the developing coun-
tries. Schott (2001) states that if rich and poor countries export the same mix
of goods in an open world economy, their workers compete directly and there
will be strong ties between the wages of these countries. He claims that the
more the countries specialize, the weaker will be the link between the wages of
these countries.
The exact factor-price equalization case is not practically so important. We
know that factor-prices in the world are not equalized. However, the conditions
that make factor-price equalization case more likely are the same conditions
that decrease factor-price di⁄erentials between the countries. Therefore, when
we talk about the conditions that make factor-price equalization case more likely,
we are also talking about the conditions which decrease the wage di⁄erentials
throughout the world.
It is understandable that economists have been keenly interested in determin-
ing the conditions under which factor-prices are equalized. Paul A. Samuelson
(1948) states the su¢ cient conditions for factor-price equalization when there
are two countries and two goods. His most restricting condition is to assume that
both countries produce both goods. With this restriction, he succeeds to save
the e⁄ort to introduce demand in the economy. Later, McKenzie (1955), Reiter
(1961), Kuga (1972), and Helpman and Krugman (1985) weakened Samuelson￿ s
assumptions. Blackorby, Schworm and Venables (1992) worked on the condi-
tions in terms of an economy￿ s revenue functions and relaxed some assumptions
of H-O model. However, the insistence in evading the introduction of demand
in the economy prevailed in the literature.
Given that factor-prices might or might not be equalized, academicians assumed
equilibriums of one way or another in their papers. Factor-price equality has
been used in trade theory to introduce and test empirically market structure
by Helpman and Krugman (1985), uncertainty by Helpman (1988) and endoge-
nous growth by Grossman and Helpman(1991). Schott, on the other hand,
criticizes previous tests of H-O theory claiming that they su⁄er from their focus
on the narrower of the model￿ s two potential equilibria which, he says, is the
one that assumes that all countries produce all goods. He works on the case
where countries with su¢ ciently disparate endowments specialize in di⁄erent
subsets of goods. With this change, he ￿nds stronger empirical support for H-O
specialization unlike previous ￿ndings.
Without de￿ning demand, we cannot solve for GE in the world. However, even
for the simplistic 2-3-2 case with homogenous CES utility function, there are a
5lot of equations and economic variables and it is hard to handle the equation
system. Moreover, as indicated in this paper, there are 6 di⁄erent possible equi-
libria and only one of them is the factor-price equalization case. Whenever we
solve the equations for factor-price equalization case, the results we get might
not constitute a valid equilibrium. The solution set may imply negative factor
allocations in some countries which is not a valid equilibrium. If this happens,
it means that the GE of the system is actually one of the remaining special-
ization cases. Therefore, it is understandable why academicians tried to avoid
introduction of demand to the economy. However, the introduction of demand
is absolutely necessary to solve for GE. In this paper, factor-price equalization
equilibrium is solved for 2-3-2 case and CES utility function. Applying compar-
ative statistics techniques on the numerical example, the paper determines the
conditions which makes factor-price equalization in GE more likely.
Before using H-O model￿ s framework to determine the conditions for which
factor-prices are more likely to be equalized, I also want to question how realis-
tic the H-O assumptions are. Today, the factors of production are more mobile
than how they used to be when Ohlin ￿rst developed his theory. We see huge
capital movements between countries. This con￿ icts with model￿ s assumption of
immobility of factors and it undermines the prediction power of Ohlin￿ s theory.
However, there are still strong restrictions against the movement of labor across
the borders. Also, some factors of production are immobile by their nature, e.g.
land. Moreover, some other developments in the world economy moved towards
H-O assumptions. For instance, technological spillover across the countries are
making the production technologies more similar throughout the world. Also,
the developments in the transportation systems and the decreasing trade bar-
riers under the guidance of WTO makes common goods-market assumption of
the model more acceptable today. I believe that determining the conditions
under which factor-prices are equalized in H-O model can contribute to our un-
derstanding of changes in factor prices, especially wage, in today￿ s globalizing
economy.
Let me give a brief outline of my paper. In the second part, I will introduce
Lerner-Pearce Diagram, which I believe is a very powerful tool to depict pro-
duction side equilibria in a multi-country, multi-good world. I will use the
diagram to demonstrate di⁄erent cases of production side equilibria, namely
factor-price equalization and non-equalization. The indeterminacy in produc-
tion is explained using this diagram. In the third section, I de￿ne demand side
of the economy by introducing CES utility function, and then I solve for GE for
2-m-n case. Using the equations, I show that the dimensionality of the space
of production side equilibria is larger for factor-price equalization case than
for non-equalization cases. So, the equilibrium possibilities are larger for factor-
price equalization case. However, the larger possibilities do not refer to di⁄erent
real equilibria, but instead to indeterminacy in production. It is demonstrated
in this section that the measure of real equilibria is the same for factor-price
equalization and non-equalization cases. In the fourth section, I numerically
6solve the model which I presented in the third section for 2-3-2 case. I show
that whether factor-prices are equalized or not in GE depends on the factor
endowments, production functions and demand. Using comparative statistic
techniques on this numerical example, I determine the conditions under which
factor-price equalization case becomes more likely.
2 Lerner-Pearce Diagram and Production side
equilibria
2.1 Introduction to Lerner-Pearce Diagram
Lerner-Pearce Diagram (L-P Diagram) is originally developed by Lerner (1952).
Pearce (1952) is credited for his discussion with Lerner. Findlay and Grubert
(1959) contributed by showing how usefully the diagram can be used. L-P
diagram is a powerful tool to depict production side equilibrium in international
trade. I recommend Deardor⁄￿ s paper (2002) for a concise but very instructive
resource. He uses the diagram and graphically demonstrates Rybcznski and
Stolper-Samuelson theorems on it. The L-P diagram is widely used by trade
theorists.
An L-P diagram basically shows the combinations of capital and labor that can
be used to produce a dollar￿ s worth of output. In Figure 1, you see an L-P
diagram for two goods: machinery and apparel. The curves for machinery and
apparel show the combinations of capital and labor amounts that can be used
to produce 1$ worth output.
The quantity of good that is worth 1$ depends on the price of the good. As-
suming a constant returns to scale production function, this means that as the
price of a good changes, the curve of the good shifts inwards or outwards along
the rays coming out of the origin. In the ￿gure, the dotted red curve represents
how the curve for apparel shifts outwards when the price of apparel decreases.
Since apparel is now cheaper, a higher quantity of apparel is needed so that it is
worth again 1$. A higher output means using higher factor inputs, so the curve
shifts outwards.
7Figure 1: Lerner-Pearce Diagram
The sloped line in the ￿gure, which I call the budget line, represents the com-
binations of labor and capital that cost 1$. Again, its location depends on the
factor prices. The budget line cuts x and y axis at 1=w and 1=r where w stands
for the factor price of labor (wage) and r stands for the factor price of capital
(interest rate). The crossing points correspond to capital and labor amounts
that is worth 1$ since the usage of the other factor is zero at these points.
Assuming perfect competition among ￿rms, ￿rms pay factor providers exactly
the market value of their production. So, factor providers will get 1$ when the
output is worth 1$. Also, perfect competition among the ￿rms guarantees that
the ￿rms will use the least costly combination of factors in production. These
two conditions ensure that the budget line on L-P diagram will be tangent to
the curve of a good if that good is produced by the ￿rms in that country.
Whenever a good is produced in a country, and given the price of that good11,
there will be many di⁄erent lines that are tangent to the same curve. So, factor
prices are indeterminate. However, if we know a second good that is produced
in that country, we will have a unique line that is tangent to both curves. You
see such a line in the ￿gure. Therefore, the prices of factor inputs will be
determinate whenever we know the prices of machinery and apparel, and that
the country produces both goods. The e¢ cient factor-intensity ratios12 are also
determined. In the ￿gure, I indicate these ratios with rays coming out of the
origin.
11Note that, given the production function of a good, the exact location of the curve for
that good on L-P Diagram is determined once the dollar price of that good is known.
12E¢ cient factor intensity ratios are the ratio of factors of production used in producing
a good at equilibrium in the production side of the economy. In the ￿gure, I indicate these
ratios with rays coming out of the origin. The rays passes through the origin and the tangency
point of the budget line and the curve of the corresponding good. E¢ cient factor-intensity
ratios of machinery and apparel productions are the slopes of the corresponding rays.
8Assume that the factor prices are more than w and r. Then, 1$ budget line will
be closer to the origin as depicted in Figure 1 by the dotted red line. However,
no ￿rms in this country will be willing to hire labor or capital at these factor
prices. They lose money if they produce machinery or apparel at these prices.
Therefore, the factor providers will decrease what they ask for from the ￿rms,
and the budget line will move outwards as depicted in the ￿gure.
2.2 Production side equilibria on L-P Diagram
2.2.1 2-2-2 Case13
Non-specialization For 2-2-2 case, if there is no specialization, it means that
both countries are producing both goods. I depict such a situation in Figure 2.
Notationally, I call the countries by letters K and L, K being the capital-intense
and L being the labor-intense country.
Figure 2: 2-2-2, Non-specialization
As it can be seen in the ￿gure, K and L share the same budget line on the
diagram since they produce the same set of goods. So, the factor-prices in the
two countries are the same. This situation is true in general. The countries
with common factor prices produce the same set of goods. In other words,
non-specialization and factor-price equalization are equivalent concepts14.
13In this paper, I will use the terms non-specialization and specialization interchangeably
with the terms factor-price equalization and non-equalization respectively.
14Of course, the equivalence of these two terms is valid for basic H-O assumptions. For
instance, if the technologies in the two countries are not the same, the two terms will not be
equivalent any more.
9The blue lines in the ￿gure represent the e¢ cient factor-intensity ratios while
producing machinery and apparel. They are determined once the prices of goods
(or factors) are determined. As it can be seen, capital is more intensely used in
the production of machinery than apparel. The red lines in the ￿gure represent
the factor endowment ratios in K and L. In each country, the equilibrium allo-
cation of factor resources in production of apparel and machinery happens in a
way to ensure that no factor resources are wasted at the end.
Given the prices of goods and factor endowments, the quantities of machinery
and apparel produced in K and L are determinate. This can be seen very easily
from equations (1), (2), (3) and (4). Assume that the factor endowments in a
country are given by k and l. The e¢ cient factor-intensity ratios to produce
machinery and apparel are determined as the slopes of blue lines in the ￿gure.
I denote these ratios with rm and ra. Then, this country should allocate its
capital and labor endowments between machinery and apparel by (km,ka) and
(lm,la) which satis￿es:
km + ka = k (1)
lm + la = l (2)
km=lm = rm (3)
ka=la = ra (4)
The above equation system has 4 equations in 4 unknowns, and there will be
a unique solution for the unknown set (km,ka,lm,la). Since the factor inputs
allocated to each sector are determinate, the production of each good in each
country will be determinate. Finally, the aggregate production in the world will
also be determinate.
Specialization Now, let us look at the specialization situation for 2-2-2 case.
Figure 3 depicts such a situation. The reasoning of this ￿gure is similar to
Figure 2. However, two points should be pointed out additionally. First of all,
notice that the lines representing the factor endowment ratios of the countries
and the e¢ cient factor-intensity ratios coincide. This situation arises, because
at equilibrium no factor endowments can be wasted in each country. Since each
country specializes in the production of only a single good, this can only be
possible if the factor-intensity ratio in a country is the same as the e¢ cient
factor-intensity ratio of the good which the country is specialized in.
10Figure 3: 2-2-2, Non-specialization
The second point I will make is that given the equilibrium prices of goods and
factor endowments, at equilibrium, ￿rms in a country should not be willing to
produce the good which the other country specializes in. In other words the
￿rms in K should not be willing to produce textile and the ￿rms in L should not
be willing to produce machinery. This condition is satis￿ed if the minimum cost
of producing the other good that is worth 1$ is more than 1$ at the prevailing
factor prices. The situation depicted in Figure 3 satis￿es this condition. This
can be seen by the dotted lines on the ￿gure which stand for the minimum cost
of producing apparel in K and machinery in L. As it can be seen, the dotted
lines are further to the origin. The production of apparel in K and machinery
in L both costs more than 1$, and the ￿rms will not be producing them.
It is easy to see that the production of machinery and apparel in K and L,
and therefore, in the world are determinate. Both countries allocate all their
resources in the production of a single good, and the quantity produced will be
determinate given the production functions. The aggregate production amounts
of the goods in the world will be the amounts produced in the two countries.
2.2.2 2-3-2 Case
Non-Specialization Figure 4 represents the non-specialization situation in
for the 2-3-3 case.
11Figure 4: 2-3-2, specialization
All the discussions about 2-2-2 case are also valid for 2-3-2 case. However, there
are now 3 goods instead of 2. Once the prices of goods and the factors are
determined, each country now solves an equation system with 5 equations in 6
unknowns: (km;kt;ka) and (lm;lt;la).
km + kt + ka = k (5)
lm + lt + la = l (6)
km=lm = rm (7)
kt=lt = rt (8)
ka=la = ra (9)
Even if we ￿x the aggregate production bundle in the world, there will be di⁄er-
ent ways of achieving this aggregate bundle by allocating the production of the
goods among the countries di⁄erently. This is the indeterminacy of production
mentioned in international trade literature in H-O model. The tables below
depict such a situation. Assume that the capital and labor endowments of K
and L are (42,26) and (41,75) respectively. Also, let us say that the e¢ cient
factor-intensity ratios used to produce 1$ worth output are 3/1, 2/2, and 1/3
for machinery, textile and apparel respectively. Then, both countries use all of
12their factor endowments if they produce the goods in quantities presented in
Table 1 and Table 2. Moreover, the aggregate production bundle in the world
is the same for both cases.
Quantity produced
Good Factor usages(capita/labor) K L World
Machinery 3/1 10 3 13
Textile 2/2 5 6 11
Apparel 1/3 2 20 22
Table 1
Quantity produced
Good Factor usages(capita/labor) K L World
Machinery 3/1 9 4 13
Textile 2/2 7 4 11
Apparel 1/3 1 21 22
Table 2
The indeterminacy in production in some country happens when the number
goods produced in that country is more than the number of factors of produc-
tion. It is a theoretical support for strategical industrial policy. It says that
a country can keep the industries which it considers as strategically important
without violating e¢ ciency. The only two restrictions imposed on a country to
be e¢ cient in production are that it should use e¢ cient factor-intensity usage
ratios in production of goods, and it should not waste its factor endowments.
However, there are many di⁄erent ways of doing that if the number of goods pro-
duced is more than the number of factors. Therefore, a capital-intense country
like Japan can keep the labor-intensive rice production sector at home without
violating e¢ ciency. Of course, if Japan wants to produce more rice, it needs
to shift its production con￿guration in other sectors to more capital-intensive
goods so that it will still be using its endowed factor-intensity ratio on average.
Specialization Figure 5 depicts 2-3-2 specialization case. Note that special-
ization does not mean that a country produces only one good. Here, each
country produces 2 goods. Note also that this is not necessarily the only way
of specialization for 2-3-2 case. It might also be the case in equilibrium that
one country produces only a single good and the other country produces the
remaining two goods. Similarly, a country might be producing all three goods
while the other produces only one good.
13Figure 5: 2-3-2, non-specialization
As for 2-2-2 non-specialization case, a country has a unique way of allocating
its capital and labor endowments between two goods without wasting any of its
factor resources. An equation system with 4 unknowns in 4 equations will arise
here as well. So, given the prices of the goods, the aggregate production bundle
in a country, and also in the world will be determinate.
2.3 Dimensionality of the set of production side equilibria
2.3.1 2-2-2 Case
Specialization If there will be an equilibrium of specialization case, the cap-
ital intense country (K) should specialize in capital-intense commodity, i.e. ma-
chinery; and the labor-intense country should specialize in labor intense com-
modity, i.e. apparel. Figure 6 demonstrates how we can determine the dimen-
sionality of the set of production side equilibria for specialization case. The
picture shows how many variables we can choose freely so that the equilibrium
of the system will be identi￿ed. The number of variables that we choose freely
is the degrees of freedom (DOF) we have. So, the set of equilibria will be a
correspondence to a bounded space with dimensionality equal to DOF.
14Figure 6: DOF in 2-2-2, specialization case
First of all, the dollar means nothing if we do not de￿ne its value in terms of a
real commodity. In other words, we need a numeraire good to ￿x the value of
1$. That means ￿xing the dollar price of a commodity so that dollar will have
a real value in terms of that commodity. Let us assume that we ￿x the price
of machinery. This will ￿x the location of the curve for machinery. Also, the
lines that represent the factor endowment ratios of K and L are exogenously
given. These lines along with the curve for machinery can be seen in the ￿rst
L-P diagram in Figure 6.
We also know that at the equilibrium no factors of production will be wasted
due to the competition in factor suppliers. So, the tangency of the budget line
for K should happen at the point where the curve for machinery production
and the line de￿ning the factor endowment ratio of K intersects. There is only
a unique line satisfying this property. As a result, the location of the line and
therefore, the factor prices in K are determined. This budget line can be seen
in the second L-P diagram in Figure 6.
The same arguments will be valid for L and the production of apparel as it is
drawn in the third and fourth L-P diagrams in Figure 6. The only di⁄erence
is that, now we can change the price of apparel freely. In an L-P diagram,
it means that we can determine the location of the curve for apparel on the
diagram freely15. We will have an equilibrium point for each price that we
choose.
To sum up, we can arrange an equilibrium in the production side of the economy
by changing the relative price of apparel with respect to machinery. The num-
ber of equilibrium points is a correspondence with a line segment, each point
15However, keep in mind that the price level should be adjusted in an interval which makes
the production of apparel in K and machinery in L more costly than 1$. This condition
is satis￿ed for the above picture, which can be seen from the dashed lines in the last L-P
diagram.
15corresponding to a di⁄erent price ratio between machinery and apparel. For all
these equilibrium points, the quantity of apparel and machinery produced in
each country is the same. Each country is allocating all its resources for the
production of the same single good.
Non-specialization Figure 7 depicts how we can determine the dimension-
ality of production side equilibria for 2-2-2 non-specialization case.
Figure 7: DOF in 2-2-2, non-specialization case
We again ￿x the position of the curve for machinery to ￿x its price in terms of
dollars. This curve is drawn in the ￿rst L-P diagram in Figure 7.
The budget line de￿ned by factor prices should be tangent to this curve. How-
ever, this time there is no need for the tangency point to be on the point where
the curve and K￿ s endowment ratio line intersects. Since K produces both ma-
chinery and apparel, K can allocate its endowments between the production of
apparel and machinery in a way so that no factor resources are wasted in the
end. This gives us the freedom to choose where the budget line intersects the
curve. We can choose r (or w) to determine the position of this line uniquely
in the second L-P diagram. After drawing the budget line, the factor prices are
determined.
There is only one point where the curve for apparel intersects the budget line.
So, the price of apparel, and therefore the location of the apparel curve on L-P
diagram will be uniquely determined. You can see this in the third L-P diagram
in Figure 7.
16Once the intersection points are determined, both countries will have only one
way of allocating their factor endowments between the production of apparel
and machinery so that they do not waste any of their factor resources at the
end. I indicated this point above with the equation system de￿ned by (1), (2),
(3), and (4). As a result, the aggregate production of apparel and machinery in
the world will also be uniquely determined.
Again, we see that the solution set is a correspondence with a line segment. We
only have the freedom to choose the price of one factor. Then, the equilibrium
in the production side of the economy will be uniquely determined. However,
unlike the specialization case, this time each of these equilibria means di⁄erent
aggregate production bundles of machinery and apparel in each country and
also in the world.
2.3.2 2-3-2 Case
Specialization Figure 8 shows how 2-3-2 specialization case16 arises. In the
￿gure, K specializes in textile and machinery, and L specializes in textile and
apparel.
Figure 8: DOF in 2-3-2, specialization case
Again, we ￿rst ￿x the dollar price of machinery. So, the position of the curve for
machinery is ￿xed. Then, we choose r in K freely. The tangency budget line will
16Remember that this is not the only specialization case for 2-3-2 setting.
17be uniquely determined afterwards. Also, the curve￿ s position for textile will be
uniquely determined. You can see this in the third L-P diagram in Figure 8.
We also choose r in L freely. The budget line tangent to the textile curve will
be uniquely determined afterwards. This will ￿x the apparel curve￿ s location as
in the ￿fth L-P diagram.
After the graph is drawn, each country will have a unique way of allocating its
factor endowments between the production of two goods so that no resources
are wasted. To sum up, the degrees of freedom that we have is 2, which means
that the number of production side equilibria will be a correspondence to a two
dimensional bounded area.
Non-specialization Figure 9 depicts the non-specialization, or equivalently
the factor-price equalization case.
Figure 9: DOF in 2-3-2, non-specialization case
Again, we ￿x the position of the curve for machinery as in the ￿rst graph. Then,
we can choose one factor price, say r, freely. We will have a unique tangency
line to the curve as in the second L-P diagram in Figure 9. The factor prices in
both countries will be determined. After the budget line is drawn, the positions
of the curves for textile and apparel will also be uniquely determined as well as
their prices.
After the prices of factors and goods and the e¢ cient factor-intensity usage
ratios are determined, each country will have an equation system of 6 variables
in 5 equations as in (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9). So, we have 5 equations for
6 unknowns, which enables us to choose one of the unknowns freely in each
18country. This means that we have two more degrees of freedom. In sum, we
will have 3 degrees of freedom.
So, do we actually have more equilibria for 2-3-2 case if factor prices are equal-
ized? The answer is yes if we accept production indeterminacy cases as di⁄erent
equilibria. However, the aggregate production in the world and all other real eco-
nomic variables are the same for all these equilibria. Therefore, I do not accept
di⁄erent instances of indeterminacy in production as di⁄erent real equilibria.
As I will demonstrate in section 3 when we assume that they are the same real
equilibrium, the number of equilibria is the same for factor-price equalization
and non-equalization cases.
3 General Equilibrium in 2-m-n case
As it is indicated in Section 2, both factor-price equalization and non-equalization
cases might arise as the production side equilibrium. However, in order to attain
GE in the economy, we also need to check whether consumers demand exactly
what is produced at relevant prices. Using CES utility function, I will show
that it is always possible to de￿ne demand in a way so that we will also have
supply-demand equality for a production side equilibrium. Then, I will solve for
GE of the model for 2-m-n case.
3.1 DEMAND







3 + ::: + ￿ncp
n]1=p
Then, a consumer who has wealth W will solve the following utility maximiza-
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s:t:








n]1=p ￿￿(P1 ￿c1 +P2 ￿c2 +P3 ￿c3 +:::+
Pn ￿ cn ￿ W)
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i = 2;3;:::;n (10)
From (10) we see that the relative consumption ratio of two goods depends
only on the prices of the goods and the parameters of the utility function. It is
independent of the wealth of the household. Since this ratio is the same for all
households independent of their wealths, it will also be the case for the aggregate
consumption amounts in the world. In other words, if W denotes the total
income of households in the world, the solution set of the above maximization
problem will give us the aggregate consumption choices of households in the
world.
In order to have supply-demand equality in the world, aggregate consumption
and production amounts should be the same, i.e.:
c1 = q1; c2 = q2;:::; cn = qn (11)
All capital and labor endowments are owned by households. And households
are fully paid for the value of their production. Therefore, the value of the
total production in the world will be equal to the total income of households
in the world. Then, if (c1;c2;c3;:::;cn) and (q1;q2;q3;:::;qn) are the aggregate
consumption and production amounts, we have:
W = P1 ￿ c1 + P2 ￿ c2 + P3 ￿ c3 + ::: + Pn ￿ cn = P1 ￿ q1 + P2 ￿ q2 + P3 ￿ q3 +
::: + Pn ￿ qn (12)
Proposition: (11) holds if and only if ci
c1 =
qi
q1 for i = 2;:::;n and (12)
holds.
Proof: It is obvious that (11) implies (12) and ci
c1 =
qi
q1 for i = 2;:::;n. I
will show how ci
c1 =
qi
q1 for i = 2;:::;n and (12) implies (4):
From (12), W = P1 ￿c1 +P2 ￿c2 +P3 ￿c3 +:::+Pn ￿cn and W = P1 ￿q1 +P2 ￿
q2 +P3 ￿q3 +:::+Pn ￿qn. If I divide these equations by c1 and q1 respectively:
W
c1 = P1 + P2 ￿ c2
c1 + P3 ￿ c3
c1 + ::: + Pn ￿ cn
c1
20W
q1 = P1 + P2 ￿
q2
q1 + P3 ￿
q3
q1 + ::: + Pn ￿
qn
q1
The right hand sides of the equations are the same since ci
c1 =
qi




q1 and c1 = q1. Using this equality in ci
c1 =
qi
q1 for i = 2;:::;n, we can also
show that ci = qi for i = 2;3;::;n.
To sum up, since we know (12) will hold in general equilibrium, supply-demand









i = 2;3;::;n (13)
Proposition: It is always possible to de￿ne a utility function of the CES form
so that supply-demand equality will be satis￿ed for some aggregate production
bundle in the world.







P1 i = 2;3;::;n
For some ￿xed value of ￿1, when we de￿ne ￿i as above we will get supply-demand
equality. Therefore, it is always possible to de￿ne demand in the economy in
CES form so that we can attain GE for any production side equilibrium.
3.2 PRODUCTION
￿ Production functions:
qi = ￿i ￿ k￿i ￿ l(1￿￿i) i = 1;2;::;n
Assume i is produced in j with i = 1;2;::;n denoting the index of good and
j = 1;2;::;m denoting the index of the country. Also, let us say that a ￿rm in
country j wants to produce q0 units of good i: At equilibrium, the ￿rm solves
the following cost minimization problem:
minfk;lg rj ￿ k + wj ￿ l
s:t:
￿i ￿ k￿i ￿ l(1￿￿i) ￿ q0
L = rjk + wjl + ￿ij(q0 ￿ ￿i ￿ k￿i ￿ l(1￿￿i))
Then:
21@L
@k : rj ￿ ￿ij ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿i ￿ k￿i￿1 ￿ l(1￿￿i) = 0
) rj = ￿ij ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿i ￿ k￿i￿1 ￿ l(1￿￿i)
@L
@k : wj ￿ ￿ij ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i ￿ k￿i ￿ l￿￿i
) wj = ￿ij ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i ￿ k￿i ￿ l￿￿i
When we divide these two equations, we ￿nd the e¢ cient factor-intensity ratio












￿ Also, the cost of production should be exactly equal to the revenue raised
by the ￿rm:
rjk + wjl = Pi ￿ ￿i ￿ k￿i ￿ l(1￿￿i)





































































To sum up, if ith good is produced in jth country, the capital labor ratios used











22￿ Denote factor prices in countries j = 1;2;::;m by (w1;r1);(w2;r2);:::;(wm;rm).
Note that the factor prices in two countries can be the same or di⁄erent.
Let us group the countries who share the same factor prices and index
these groups by f = 1;2;:::;F. Since the sets are disjoint and each set has
at least one element, F ￿ m. Let us denote the factor prices in each set
by:
(w1;r1);(w2;r2);::;(wf;rf);::;(wF;rF)




rf0 for f < f0. I will continue with
some propositions.
1) At equilibrium, each country will be producing at least one good.
Proof:
Without loss of generality, assume the ￿rst country (j = 1) does not produce
anything. Then, no ￿rms in that country is producing anything and all factor re-
sources are unemployed. Factor providers will be ready to sell their endowments
for any strictly positive price.
Assume i is produced in j 6= 1. Then:
rjk + wjl = Pi ￿ ￿i ￿ k￿i ￿ l(1￿￿i)
But then, a ￿rm can buy k and l in the ￿rst country by paying (w1;r1) such
that 0 < r1 < rj and 0 < w1 < wj and earn strictly positive pro￿t which is:
Pi ￿ ￿i ￿ k￿i ￿ l(1￿￿i) ￿ r1k + w1l > Pi ￿ ￿i ￿ k￿i ￿ l(1￿￿i) ￿ rjk + wjl = 0
Since the ￿rms will take advantage of any pro￿table opportunity, this situa-
tion cannot be an equilibrium. Each country produces at least one good at
equilibrium.
2) Two countries with factor prices (wf;rf) and (wf0;rf0) with f 6= f0 can
produce at most one good in common.
Proof:
Each time a good is produced in a country, we have an equation of the form
(15). Given that two goods are produced in that country, we can ￿nd the factor
prices for that country using the two equations of the form (15) for any given
prices of the goods. But then, if the same two goods are produced between two
countries, the factor prices that we ￿nd for these two countries will be the same.
This contradicts with our initial assumption. So, at equilibrium two countries
with di⁄erent factor prices can produce at most one good in common.
233) wf > wf0 if and only if rf < rf0.
Proof:
Assume wf > wf0 and rf ￿ rf0 By 1, a good will be produced in a country
who has factor prices (wf;rf). But then, a ￿rm in a country with factor prices
(wf0;rf0) can produce the same good by using the same factor intensity ratio
as in the other country at a lower cost. Then, this ￿rm makes pro￿t, which is
not possible. So, between two countries with di⁄erent factor prices, labor will
be cheaper in one of them, and capital will be cheaper in the other. The proof
from the other direction is similar.
4) For w1 > w2 > w3, there cannot be any good that is produced by 1 and
3 but not by 2.
Proof:
By 3, r1 < r2 < r3. So, w1
r1 > w2
r2 > w3
r3 . Assume that there is a good i which is










Since i is not produced in 2, it means that the minimum cost of producing this
good in the second country is more than Pi
17:



































By 1, the second country will be producing some good. I index this good by
ii. Since this good is produced in the second country, the ￿rst and the third
countries cannot produce it less costly than the second country. So, the implied
price of the good using (15) in the second country should be less than or equal






































































r3 , we have r2
w2
w1
r1 > 1 and r2
w2
w3
r3 < 1. Using r2
w2
w1
r1 > 1 above,
we have ￿i > ￿ii. However, using r2
w2
w3
r3 < 1 above, we have ￿i < ￿ii. This is a
contradiction.
5) 2 and 4 implies that for the ordered factor prices set w1
r1 > w2
r2 > ::: >
wf
rf > :: > wF
rF , we can only have a common good produced for the factor price
sets of f = 1;2, f = 2;3 etc. If there are b goods that are produced by countries
with di⁄erent factor prices, this means that b < F ￿ m.
6) Each country will be in one factor price set. Let us denote the number
of countries who has factor prices (wf;rf) by mf, f = 1;2;::;F. Since each
country is only in one set,
PF
f=1 mf = m.
7) The cost of producing a good is the same in countries that share the same
factor prices. Therefore, the ￿rms in these countries can produce the same set
of goods without making loss. So, I can index the number of goods produced
by fth set by nf. When there are b goods that are produced in two sets, we
have
PF
f=1 nf = n + b.
8) A country with factor prices (wf;rf) will allocate its factor endowments




ii )f denote the capital and labor resources
allocated for the production of iith good by jjth country in fth set where ii =
1;2;::;nf, jj = 1;2;::;mf, and f = 1;::;F. Similarly, let (kjj)f and (ljj)f be
the factor endowments of this country.
Notice that I introduced a new way of indexing goods and countries. Now each
country will be identi￿ed by its (f;jj) indices. There is a one-to-one relationship
between j and (f;jj): j  ! (f;jj).
Similarly, a good is identi￿ed by (f;ii). However, a good can be produced by
more than one group of countries with the same factor prices (actually at most
two as we proved in 2). So, the relationship between i to (f;ii) is one-to-many,
and (f;ii) to i is many-to-one.
I de￿ne the following indicator function for future use:
If(f;ii);ig :1 if the good indexed by (f;ii) and i are the same good, 0 otherwise.









ii )f = (ljj)f (19)
25The factor intensities used should be equal to e¢ cient capital-labor ratios which











(￿ii)f stands for the capital share in the production of the iith good in fth set.
3.3 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM











i = 2;3;::;n (GE1)









ii )f = (ljj)f jj = 1;2;::;mf; f = 1;::;F (GE3)










1￿(￿ii)f ii = 1;2;::;nf; jj = 1;2;::;mf; f = 1;::;F (GE4)





f 8i;f s.t. 9ii with If(f;ii);ig = 1 (GE5)











i )f)(1￿￿i) i = 1;2;3;::;n
(GE6)
Remark: The equality constraints are necessary but not su¢ cient condi-
tions for GE. To ensure GE, any solution to above equations should also be
checked for the two conditions below, which I call the feasibility conditions:
F.1: (k
jj
ii )f ￿ 0; (l
jj
ii )f ￿ 0 for ii = 1;2;:::nf; jj = 1;2;::;mf; f = 1;::;F18
F.2: If i is produced by countries in sets f = a and f = a + 1, i should be
the good with the lowest capital intensity in ath set and highest capital-intensity
in bth set.
The second condition is required in order to eliminate anomalous solutions of
the equations like the case depicted with an L-P diagram below. The case in
￿gure satis￿es all production side equality constraints. If it satis￿es the equality
constraint ensuring supply-demand equality, we may mistakenly conclude that
the solution is GE even if it is not. For the case depicted below, the ￿rms in
the labor-intense country can produce the second good pro￿tably.
Figure 10: Anomalous solution that might arise if solution is not checked for
the second feasibility constraint.




f=1 nf ￿ mf
18We cannot have negative factor allocations at equilibrium.
27labor allocations:
PF
f=1 nf ￿ mf
good prices: n
factor prices: 2 ￿ F
quantities produced: n
# of equations
(GE1) : n ￿ 1
(GE2) :
PF
f=1 mf = m
(GE3) :
PF
f=1 mf = m
(GE4) :
PF
f=1 nf ￿ mf
(GE5) : n + b
(GE6) : n
1 equation to de￿ne the numeraire good: e.g.r1 = 1$








n ￿ 1 + 2m +
PF




f=1 nf ￿ mf + (2F ￿ n ￿ 2m ￿ b) (21)















f=1 nf ￿ mf + (2F ￿ 2m ￿ b ￿ 1) (22)
Note that the dimensionality of equilibriums in the production side of the econ-
omy which we determined using L-P diagram in Section 3 for 2-2-2 and 2-3-2
cases are instances of the above equation20.
￿ DOF in production side when factor-prices equalize:
F = 1; b = 0; n1 = n; m1 = m :
DOF = n ￿ m + 2 ￿ 2m ￿ b ￿ 1
) DOF = (n ￿ 2) ￿ m + 1 (23)
19Without n-1 supply-demand equality constraints.
20e.g. 2-3-2 non-specialization case: F = 1;b = 0;n1 = 3;m1 = 2
) DOF = 6 + 2 ￿ 4 ￿ 1 = 3
2-3-2 specialization case with F = 2;b = 1;n1 = 2;n2 = 2;m1 = 1;m2 = 1 :
) DOF = 2 ￿ 1 + 2 ￿ 1 + 4 ￿ 4 ￿ 1 ￿ 1 = 2
28￿ Maximum DOF that can be attained in production side when factor-prices















f=1 nf ￿ mf + 2F ￿ 2m ￿ b ￿ 1 (24)
Given F and b, the above term is maximized when
PF
f=1 nf ￿mf is maximized.
Since
PF
f=1 nf = n + b and
PF
f=1 mf = m, the value of
PF
f=1 nf ￿ mf will be
maximized when we choose (nf;mf) as (1;1) for all but one pair. Let us say
this is the pair for f = 1. Then:
PF
f=1 nf ￿ mf = (n + b ￿ (F ￿ 1)) + (m ￿ (F ￿ 1)) + F ￿ 1
= F2 ￿ 2F + 1 ￿ (F ￿ 1)(m + n + b) + m(n + b) + F ￿ 1
Maximized DOF for ￿xed F and b and for n > 2 becomes:
= 2F ￿ 2m ￿ b ￿ 1 + (n + b ￿ (F ￿ 1)) + (m ￿ (F ￿ 1)) + F ￿ 1
= F2 ￿ 2F + 1 ￿ (F ￿ 1)(m + n + b) + m(n + b) + F ￿ 1
) DOF = (n￿2)￿m+1+((m ￿ F) ￿ (￿F + 1 + b) + (F ￿ 1) ￿ (￿n + 2)) (25)
￿ 0 ￿ 0 > 0 < 0
< (n ￿ 2) ￿ m + 1
Therefore, the degrees of freedom is more for the factor-price equalization case
if n > 2, i.e. when the number of factors is more than the number of goods. The
number of equilibrium points for factor-price equalization case is larger than the
number of equilibrium points when factor-prices do not equalize.
Nevertheless, when we consider only the real equilibria, we see that the number
of equilibria in the production side of the economy is the same.21 The countries
who share the same factor prices behave as if they are the same country. The
only thing that matters is how this joint country allocates its aggregate factor
endowments. How this allocation is allocated between the constituent countries
does not matter. Di⁄erent equilibria as a result of indeterminacy in production
do not di⁄er from each other in terms of real economic variables.
In order to calculate the number of real equilibria, we replace mf by 1 and
m by F in the above equations. This way, we do not count indeterminacy of
production as di⁄erent equilibria. We only look at how the aggregate factor
endowments of the countries who share common factor prices are allocated.
Then, DOF in production side becomes:
21What is meant by real equiliria is the equilibria with di⁄erent aggregate production bun-
dles and factor prices. In this sense, di⁄erent instances of indeterminacy in production are










f=1 nf ￿ mf + n + b + n + 1
￿
= 2 ￿ (n + b) + 2n + 2F ￿ 2F ￿ (n + b) ￿ 2n ￿ b ￿ 1
) DOF = n ￿ 1 (26)
What we found by (26) is very important. The dimensionality of the set of
production side real equilibria is the same whether factor prices are equalized
or some countries are specialized in production. The dimensionality of the set
is the same for di⁄erent specialization cases too22. So, the measures of all these
sets are the same and the factor-price equalization is a real possibility23. It
happens depending on the parameters and factor allocations in the countries.
Note that when we assume additional n ￿ 1 restrictions from supply-demand
equality constraints, the number of variables and equations is exactly the same.
So, we expect a single solution of the above equation systems for any F and b
values that we choose. Of course, for some solution to be a valid GE, feasibility
constraints should be satis￿ed too.
4 A Numerical Example, 2-3-2 Case
Note that there are 6 di⁄erent possibilities of GE for 2-3-2 case, which are:
1:F = 1;b = 0;n1 = 3;n2 = 3
2:F = 2;b = 1;n1 = 3;n2 = 1
3:F = 2;b = 1;n1 = 2;n2 = 2
4:F = 2;b = 1;n1 = 1;n2 = 3
5:F = 2;b = 0;n1 = 2;n2 = 1
6:F = 2;b = 0;n1 = 1;n2 = 2
Figure 11 below depicts these possibilities:
22In terms of the notation I introduced above, di⁄erent specialization instances are di⁄erent
(F;b) bundles where 0 ￿ b < F < m and F 6= 1. Remember that F = 1 means factor-price
equalization, i.e. non-specialization.
23What I mean by real possibility is that it is not a corner-solution which happens with
zero probability.
30Figure 11: Di⁄erent production side equilibrium possibilities for 2-3-2 case
on L-P diagram.
We are only interested in the ￿rst case which is factor-price equalization. I will
solve for GE for factor-price equalization using the equation system de￿ned in
3.3:
4.1 GE Equation System
Let us use the cost of capital as numeraire good and ￿x its dollar price to 1$,
i.e. r = 1.
Then:




































3 = l2 (32)











































￿ From ￿rm￿ s problem
P1 = &1w1￿￿1r￿1 (39)
P2 = &2w1￿￿2r￿2 (40)
P3 = &3w1￿￿3r￿3 (41)
￿ Aggregate quantities produced
q1 = ￿1 ￿ (k1
1)￿1 ￿ (l1
1)(1￿￿1) + ￿1 ￿ (k2
1)￿1 ￿ (l2
1)(1￿￿1) (42)
q2 = ￿2 ￿ (k1
2)￿2 ￿ (l1
2)(1￿￿2) + ￿2 ￿ (k2
2)￿1 ￿ (l2
2)(1￿￿2) (43)
q3 = ￿3 ￿ (k1
3)￿3 ￿ (l1
3)(1￿￿3) + ￿3 ￿ (k2
3)￿3 ￿ (l2
3)(1￿￿3) (44)
4.2 SOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM
1) Given w, we can solve for P1,P2, and P3 using (39), (40) and (41):
P1 = &1w1￿￿1 (45)
P2 = &2w1￿￿2 (46)
P3 = &3w1￿￿3 (47)
2) We can ￿nd q2overq1sd =
q2
q1 and q3overq1sd =
q3


























































3) Using (33), (34), (35), (36), (37), and (38), we can ￿nd the capital allocations
in each country in terms of labor allocations:
k1




















3 = w ￿ ￿3
1￿￿3 ￿ l2
3 (55)
Also, e¢ ciency ratios are as:
e1
1;e2








3 = w ￿ ￿3
1￿￿3 (58)













3 = l1 ￿ l1
1 ￿ l1
2
Use (50), (51), and (52) in (29) and replace l1
3 with what we found above:
w ￿ ￿1
1￿￿1 ￿ l1
1 + w ￿ ￿2
1￿￿2 ￿ l1
2 + w ￿ ￿3






















































w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k1 + ￿2 ￿ l1 + ￿3 ￿ l1
1
l1
3 = l1 ￿ l1
1 ￿
￿ 1




3 = l1 ￿ (￿3 + 1)l1
1 ￿
￿ 1
w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k1 + ￿2 ￿ l1￿
l1
3 = (1 ￿ ￿2)l1 ￿ (￿3 + 1)l1
1 ￿ 1
w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k1







w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k1 + ￿2 ￿ l1 + ￿3 ￿ l1
1 (59)
l1
3 = (1 ￿ ￿2)l1 ￿ (￿3 + 1)l1
1 ￿ 1






w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k2 + ￿2 ￿ l2 + ￿3 ￿ l2
1 (61)
l2
3 = (1 ￿ ￿2)l2 ￿ (￿3 + 1)l2
1 ￿ 1
w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k2 (62)
where:





















5) Quantities produced are:
q11 = ￿1 ￿ (w ￿ ￿1
1￿￿1 ￿ l1
1)￿1 ￿ (l1
1)(1￿￿1) = w￿1 ￿ ￿1( ￿1
1￿￿1)￿1 ￿ l1
1
) q11 = ￿1 ￿ w￿1 ￿ l1
1 (63)
q12 = ￿1 ￿ (w ￿ ￿1
1￿￿1 ￿ l2
1)￿1 ￿ (l2
1)(1￿￿1) = w￿1 ￿ ￿1( ￿1
1￿￿1)￿1 ￿ l2
1
) q12 = ￿1 ￿ w￿1 ￿ l2
1 (64)
q21 = ￿2 ￿ (w ￿ ￿2
1￿￿2 ￿ l1
2)￿2 ￿ (l1
2)(1￿￿2) = w￿2 ￿ ￿2( ￿2
1￿￿2)￿2 ￿ l1
2
) q21 = ￿2 ￿ w￿2 ￿ l1
2 (65)
q22 = ￿2 ￿ (w ￿ ￿2
1￿￿2 ￿ l2
2)￿1 ￿ (l2
2)(1￿￿2) = w￿2 ￿ ￿2( ￿2
1￿￿2)￿2 ￿ l2
2
) q22 = ￿2 ￿ w￿2 ￿ l2
2 (66)
q31 = ￿3 ￿ (w ￿ ￿3
1￿￿3 ￿ l1
3)￿3 ￿ (l1
3)(1￿￿3) = w￿3 ￿ ￿3( ￿3
1￿￿3)￿3 ￿ l1
3
) q31 = ￿3 ￿ w￿3 ￿ l1
3 (67)
q32 = ￿3 ￿ (w ￿ ￿3
1￿￿3 ￿ l2
3)￿3 ￿ (l2
3)(1￿￿3) = w￿3 ￿ ￿3( ￿3
1￿￿3)￿3 ￿ l2
3
) q32 = ￿3 ￿ w￿3 ￿ l2
3 (68)
where ￿1 = ￿1( ￿1
1￿￿1)￿1;￿2 = ￿2( ￿2
1￿￿2)￿2;￿3 = ￿3( ￿3
1￿￿3)￿3
















































p￿1 ￿ ￿21 = ￿2￿w
￿2








































































































































The only unknown in this equation is w. Unfortunately, we cannot solve this
equation explicitly for w. We need to use numerical methods to calculate it.
Once we solve for w, we determine l1 = l1
1+l2
1. Notice that we cannot solve for l1
1
and l2
1, but only for their sum. This is the so-called indeterminacy of production.
What matters is what the sums of factors allocated for the production of each
good. It does not matter who allocates how much. As you will see below, once
we solve for l1, we can also solve for l2 = l1
2 + l2
2 and l3 = l1
3 + l2












w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k2 + ￿2 ￿ l2 + ￿3 ￿ l2
1

















3 = (1 ￿ ￿2)l1 ￿ (￿3 + 1)l1
1 ￿ 1
w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k1
l2
3 = (1 ￿ ￿2)l2 ￿ (￿3 + 1)l2
1 ￿ 1
w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k2













354.3 ALGORITHM TO SOLVE FOR GE WITH FACTOR-
PRICE EQUALIZATION
Given all the parameters and factor endowments of the countries, we can solve
for the factor-price equalization w using numerical procedure in (69) as above.
Then, we also determine the aggregate factor allocations to each good, ￿rst
(l1;l2;l3) by (69), (70), and (71) and then (k1;k2;k3) using (50)+(53), (51)+(54)
and (52)+(55). However, we need to ￿x one factor allocation in some country,
e.g. l1













Nonetheless, the solution set that we ￿nd might not constitute a valid equilib-
rium. We should also check for the feasibility constraints which are stated by F.1
and F.2 in 3:3. F.2 is not relevant to factor-price equalization case. However, we







should be all non-negative24.
In order to write an algorithm that checks whether there is a GE where factor-
prices are equalized, we should ￿rst determine the relationships between factor

























So, both ￿3 and ￿3 + 1 are negative. Using this information in the equations









Since we can solve for l2 = l1
2 + l2
2 given the factor allocations and parameters,
we have the following relationship between l1








Using this relationship, we can use the following algorithm to check whether
factor-prices equalize or not given factor endowments and parameters:













3) is non-negative since e¢ cient factor-
intensity ratios are positive.
25Remember that ￿1 > ￿2 > ￿3 by de￿nition.
36ALGORITHM
1) Solve for w in (69) using numerical methods. Then calculate l1;l2;l3 using
(69), (70), and (71) :
2) Check whether l1 > 0; l2 > 0; and l3 > 0. If not, then there is no factor-price
equalization If yes, go step 3).
3) Assign l1





2 = l2 ￿ l1
2 = l2 ￿ l1
Use (62), (31) and l2




















1 > 0 and l2
3 > 0. If not, then there is no factor-price equalization
equilibrium. If yes, go step 4).
4) Solve for l1
2 = Boundary1 for which l2
1 = 0. Also, solve for l1
2 = Boundary2
for which l2




w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k2 + ￿2 ￿ l2 + ￿3 ￿ l2
1 = 1
w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k2 + ￿2 ￿ l2
Then:
Boundary1 = l1
2 = l2 ￿ l2
2 = l2 ￿ 1
w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k2 ￿ ￿2 ￿ l2
From (63):
l2
3 = 0 = (1 ￿ ￿2)l2 ￿ (￿3 + 1)l2
1 ￿ 1
w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k2
) (￿3 + 1)l2
1 = (1 ￿ ￿2)l2 ￿ 1









1 = l1 ￿ l2









3 increases. So, given w, l2
1 and l2
3 attains their maximum values
for the largest value that l1
2 can take, which is l1. If the values of l2
1 and l2
3 are negative for
l1
2 = l1, then there is no way to make them positive for w.
27As l1
2 #) l2
1 # and l2





3 are all non-negative.















) Boundary2 = 1
















2 > 028 :
Use l1

















1 = l1 ￿ l1










3 = (1 ￿ ￿2)l1 ￿ 1
w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k1 ￿ (￿3 + 1)l1
1
) l1
3 = (1 ￿ ￿2)l1 ￿ 1









w ￿ ￿1 ￿ k2 + ￿2 ￿ l2 + ￿3 ￿ l2




1 > 0; and l2
2 > 0. If not, then there is no factor-price
equalization equilibrium. If yes, there is factor price equalization.
4.4 COMPARATIVE STATISTICS
In an autarky, there is a single goods market and a single factors market. In
Heckscher-Ohlin model, while the goods market is common, there are di⁄erent
factors markets in each country. What factor-price equalization theorem says is
that the common goods market assumption might ensure the equality of factor
prices in di⁄erent countries even if the factors markets are not the same.
The common goods market always works in a way to reduce the di⁄erences
between factor prices in di⁄erent countries. However, whether its in￿ uence










2 should be all non-negative for l1
2 = Boundary. If not, it means that there
is no GE for w.
38demand and production functions. When can factor prices be equalized even
if the factors markets are separate? This will happen when the mobility of
goods removes the necessity for factors to move, i.e., when factor-immobility is
no longer a restriction on the system. In that case, we can ￿rst solve for GE
in the autarkic world29 and then allocate the aggregate production bundle in
the world among the constituent countries in a way so that each country uses
exactly its factor endowments to produce the bundle which it is allocated.
Then, the question we should answer becomes: When is the mobility of goods
good enough to ensure factor-price equality? In other words, what should be
the characteristics of endowments, demand and production functions so that
factor prices in di⁄erent countries are equalized?
The question is answered for endowments. Factor prices in two countries will be
equalized if the factor endowment ratios in the two countries are close enough. In
order to understand the intuition behind this proposition, let us think about the
extreme instance of it which is the equality of factor endowment ratios between
all countries. Notationally, if (Ki;Li) and (K;L) are the factor endowments
in ith country and world respectively, equality of factor endowments in each
country corresponds to Ki
Li = K
L = ￿30 for all i. Then, if the autarky production
amounts in the world are (q1;q2;:::;qn) andKi
K = Li
L = ￿i, we can assign ith
country (￿iq1;￿iq2;:::;￿iqn). i will produce exactly this bundle at factor prices
equal to world autarkic factor prices. Therefore, factors do not need to move
when the factor endowment ratios in each country is the same, and we will
always have factor-price equalization.
If we slightly shift from the exact equality case, we can still obtain factor-price
equality by changing production bundles allocated to each country. For instance,
if factor-intensity ratio in a country is slightly more than ￿, it should be assigned
slightly more from a good which uses capital more intensely. So, we will still be
able to obtain factor-price equality. However, if the factor endowment ratios in
each country becomes su¢ ciently di⁄erent, we will no longer be able to make
this adjustment feasibly.
I will use the above property to make comparative statistics analysis in my
2-3-2 example. We know that factor-prices will always equalize if the factor
endowments between the two countries are close enough. However, how close
they should be depends on demand and production functions. In this section, I
￿x the capital and labor endowments in the ￿rst country (K1 and L1), which is
de￿ned to be the capital-intense country. I also ￿x the labor endowment in the
second country (L2), which is de￿ned to be the labor-intense country. Then, for
the remaining parameter set, I solve for the minimum capital endowment in the
29One country with factor endowments being the sums of factor endowments in each country,
and demand being the aggregated demand in the world.
30￿ is the capital/labor factor endowment ratio in the world.
39second country (K2) for which factor prices are equalized. I name this critical
value Critical K 2. Then, there will be factor-price equalization for K2 values in
[Critical K 2,K1
L1 L2] interval.
In order to ￿nd Critical K 2, I de￿ne a grid for K2 which is dense enough. Then,
I calculate whether factor prices are equalized at each point on the grid using the
algorithm presented in Section 3.4. Then, I assign Critical K 2 as the minimum
K2 on the grid where factor prices are equalized.
The plots presented in this section show the relationship between Critical K 2
and some parameters. All relevant algorithm is written and calculations are done
by MATLAB. For each plot, I ￿x the remaining parameters and change only the
value of the relevant parameter. If Critical K 2 value increases as one parameter
value changes, it means that the factor endowment ratios should be closer for
factor-price equalization. So, the change makes factor-price equalization more
unlikely31.
4.4.1 Changes in ￿
Figure 12 shows how Critical K 2 changes as ￿1;￿2; and ￿3 changes. As it
can be seen from the ￿gures, factor-price equalization case becomes more likely
when ￿1 and ￿3 gets closer to their limits, which are 1 and 0 respectively. The
relationship between ￿2 and Critical K 2 is not strict. Factor-price equalization
becomes more unlikely as ￿2 gets closer to some intermediate value, and it
becomes more likely as ￿2 goes away from this intermediate value. The result is
clear. As capital￿ s share in the production functions of di⁄erent goods become
more dissimilar, the probability of getting factor-price equalization increases.
Figure 12: ￿ and Critical K 2
31In this section, I frequently use the terms "likely" and "unlikely". Actually, given factor
endowments and the parameter set, there is no sense in talking about the"likelihood" of factor-
price equalization or not. Factor prices are either equalized or not. However, when the capital
allocation in the second country is unknown, we can talk about the likelihood of factor-price
equalization. As one parameter changes, Critical K 2 value increases or decreases. Therefore,
for random K2; the likelihood of factor-price equalization changes as one parameter value
changes.
40This becomes more understandable if we think of the extreme case, which is
having goods with only capital￿ s shares of 1 or 0 in the production functions.
Then, the production functions are f(K;L) = ￿iK and f(K;L) = ￿jL, where
￿i = 1 and ￿j = 0 If the prices of the goods are Pi and Pj, we will have
r = Pi￿i and w = Pj￿j in both countries, whatever the factor endowments are.
So, factor-price equalization is guaranteed.
Figure 13 shows more clearly how the probability of getting factor-price equal-
ization increases as the capital shares of the goods become more dissimilar. In
this ￿gure, ￿2 is ￿xed and ￿1 and ￿3 are assigned ￿2+x and ￿2￿x respectively.
As it is clear from the ￿gure, Critical K 2 decreases as ￿ values become more
dissimilar. For very similar ￿ values32, Critical K 2 becomes very close to 20 and
we need almost factor endowment ratios to be equal in order to get factor-price
equalization.
Figure 13: ￿ similarities and Critical K 2
4.4.2 Changes in p
We know from Economic Theory that 1
1￿p is the elasticity of substitution for
CES utility function. So, an increase in p means an increase in elasticity of
substitution. Figure 14 shows the relationship between p and Critical K 2. As
p goes 1, this means that the substitutability of the goods increases. Figure 14
shows that as the goods become more substitutable, factor-price equalization
case becomes more unlikely.
32When x is close to zero.
41Figure 14: p and Critical K 2
This result is intuitive. As the goods become more substitutable, the willingness
of countries to trade goods will decrease. The goods missing in a country can
be more easily substituted by the ones it produces in excess. Therefore, less
goods will be traded and the equilibrium will resemble more to the case where
each country is an autarky. For large values of p, factor prices are unlikely to be
equalized unless the factor endowments in the two countries are very similar.
4.4.3 Changes in ￿
Figure 15 shows how changes in total factor productivities (TFPs) change Crit-
ical K 2. While increases in total factor productivities of the ￿rst and the third
good decrease Critical K 2 and work on behalf of factor-price equalization, the
case is on contrary for the second good.
Figure 15: ￿ and Critical K 2
42The improvements in technologies (TFPs) to produce extreme goods increase
the likelihood of factor-price equalization. However, the technological improve-
ments to produce the intermediary goods make factor-price equalization more
unlikely.
4.4.4 Changes in ￿
Figure 16 shows the relationships between ￿ values and Critical K 2. These
relationships are the most di¢ cult to interpret. As it can be seen, while the
increase in ￿2 decreases the probability of attaining factor-price equalization,
the relationships for ￿1 and ￿3 are not strict.
Figure 16: ￿ and Critical K 2
As it is clear from the utility function, an increase in ￿ means stronger demand
for that good. The second plot in Figure 16 shows that stronger demand for
intermediate goods makes factor-price equalization unlikely. The ￿rst and third
plots show that an increase in demand for the extreme goods might or might
not increase the probability of getting factor-price equalization.
If ￿1 is large enough to force the ￿rst country to completely specialize in produc-
ing the ￿rst good, the probability of getting factor-price equalization decreases
if ￿1 increases. A rise in ￿1 only encourages the ￿rst country further to spe-
cialize in the ￿rst good. So, Critical K 2 increases. However, if ￿1 is not large
enough to force the ￿rst country to produce just the ￿rst good, the increase in
￿1 will increase r and decrease w in the ￿rst country since the demand for good
1 stronger and good 1 is capital intensive. This will decrease the factor price dif-
ferentials between the two countries, and ￿nally lead factor-price equalization.
The argument is the similar for the third good.
The relationship is strict for the second good. If the demand for the second
good decreases, its price will decrease. The second good is relatively labor
intensive for the ￿rst country and capital intensive for the second country. As
its price decreases, the ￿rst country shifts its production to the ￿rst good and
the second country shifts its production to the third good. Therefore, the capital
43will be more valuable in the ￿rst country and labor will be more valuable in the
second country. The factor price di⁄erentials will decrease and ultimately lead
to factor-price equalization33.
5 Conclusion
The exact factor-price equalization case is not practically so important. We
know that factor-prices in the world are not equalized. Most of the assumptions
of the naive Heckscher-Ohlin model which I analyzed above are not right. The
production technologies are neither exactly constant returns to scale, nor the
same between di⁄erent countries. Moreover, there are many trade imperfections
in the real world like transportation costs, trade barriers etc.
However, the conditions that make factor-price equalization case more likely are
the same conditions that decrease factor-price di⁄erentials between the coun-
tries. Therefore, when we talk about the conditions that make factor-price
equalization case more likely, we are also talking about the conditions which
decrease the wage di⁄erentials throughout the world.
This paper investigates the likelihood of factor-price equalization under the sim-
ple assumptions of Heckscher-Ohlin Theory. Factor-price equalization is also
directly related to whether countries specialize or not in the global market.
In the second section of the paper, L-P diagram is introduced and it is showed
that it can be used e⁄ectively to demonstrate production side equilibria. It is
also showed that there are di⁄erent possibilities of equilibria, namely factor-
price equalization and specialization, when we look at only the production side
of an economy.
In the third section, GE problem is solved for 2-m-n case for naive Heckscher-
Ohlin model and introducing homogenous CES utility function to de￿ne demand
in the economy. It is demonstrated that the set of equilibrium possibilities for
factor-price equalization case is much larger if the number of commodities is
more than the number of factors of production. However, the larger possibilities
do not refer to di⁄erent real equilibria, but only to indeterminacy in production.
If we exclude indeterminacy of production from our analysis, we see that the
measure of GE sets for factor-price equalization and non-equalization cases are
the same, which is actually zero. Therefore, there is only a unique solution of
the equation system de￿ning GE for factor price equalization case and di⁄erent
specialization cases. However, being a solution to the equation system does not
33Remember that for factor-price non-equalization cases, capital is cheaper and labor is more
expensive in the ￿rst country since it is capital abundant and labor de￿cient by de￿nition.
So, a change which inreases capital￿ s value in the ￿rst country and labor￿ s value in the second
country will decrease the factor price di⁄erentials between the two countries.
44guarantee that the solution is a valid GE. The feasibility constraints should also
be satis￿ed, which are presented in this section.
In the fourth section, 2-3-2 case is solved numerically. The comparative statistics
analysis of this example implied the following results about the likelihood of
factor-price equalization:
￿ The probability of getting factor-price equalization increases if the factor
endowment ratios of the countries become closer.
￿ The probability of getting factor-price equalization increases if capital￿ s
share in the production functions of di⁄erent goods become more dissim-
ilar.
￿ The probability of getting factor-price equalization decreases if the goods
become more substitutable.
￿ The improvements in technologies (TFPs) to produce extreme goods in-
crease the likelihood of factor-price equalization. However, the technolog-
ical improvements to produce the intermediary goods decrease the likeli-
hood of factor-price equalization..
￿ The probability of getting factor-price equalization decreases if demand
for the intermediary goods increases. The relationship for the extreme
goods changes depending on the parameters and endowments.
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